Wednesday, June 02, 2004
Brookings Institute: How to win in Iraq?
The Brookings Institute has a couple of articles out right outlining plans for Iraq.
The first is a piece by Philip H Gordon (Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies
) and James Dobbins (Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, Rand Corporation). This piece suggests that in order for the US to regain some sufferance from Iraqis, our military strategies must be adjusted to meet the political/diplomatic goals it has set forth:
Henceforth, American forces cannot afford to destroy villages to save them. They cannot afford to use artillery, gunships and ordnance from fixed-wing aircraft in populated areas, regardless of the provocation. They cannot afford to sacrifice innocent Iraqi civilians to reduce American casualties. They cannot afford to sweep up, incarcerate and hold for months thousands of Iraqis—many of them innocent—to apprehend a smaller number of guilty ones. They cannot afford to use pain, privation or humiliation to secure information.
Whether such actions are consistent with the laws of armed conflict is not the relevant criterion. What matters most is that such actions are inconsistent with the treatment of an allied population upon whose sufferance and support this mission depends.
James Steinberg and Michael O'Hanlon, also of the Brookings Institute have outlined a three point plan for getting the US out of Iraq:
First, we must make clear that our military presence in Iraq is designed to permit the Iraqis to freely choose their own future -- even if it is not fully to our liking. We should indicate not just that we will leave if asked but that we will ourselves plan to end the deployment of coalition forces following the election of an Iraqi government and the adoption of a new constitution next year. We should make clear that we (as part of a wider international coalition) would be prepared to stay beyond that time -- but only at the request of the new Iraqi government, and as part of a new, U.N.-sponsored mandate on terms that are acceptable to the new Iraqi government and to us.
Second, we must be clear about our legitimate security interests in Iraq. We have a right to insist that a new Iraqi government not threaten peace and security -- by developing weapons of mass destruction, harboring terrorists or attacking other nations. And we should certainly seek to use our influence to encourage a tolerant, pluralist society. But because this is a responsibility Iraq owes to all, not just us, we should shift the focus away from the United States as the enforcement arm of the international community to Iraq's neighbors and others that share these interests, including NATO and the United Nations. We should begin by convening a major international summit on Iraq, involving not only Western allies but also Arab leaders and Iraqis, at the time of the NATO summit next month in Istanbul. And we should invite the International Atomic Energy Agency to play a role in ensuring that a new Iraqi government does not pursue weapons programs.
Third, we should accelerate the training and equipping of new security forces for Iraq. Less than 10 percent of the necessary numbers of soldiers and police have been properly trained to date. Filling this vacuum is critical to the success of this strategy, because indigenous forces are far more likely than foreign forces to succeed in defeating the residual Baathist and foreign fighters in Iraq. If Arab countries and NATO devoted just 10 percent of their police and military training capacity to Iraqi forces, we could complete an intensified training process by next year.
I have not been a supporter of the efforts in Iraq. I've thought that we were wrong from the outset to go in and do what we did...but we're there. The important thing is that we clean up our mess and get out as soon as possible. I think those ideas outlined above are a very good start toward that goal.
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The first is a piece by Philip H Gordon (Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies
) and James Dobbins (Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, Rand Corporation). This piece suggests that in order for the US to regain some sufferance from Iraqis, our military strategies must be adjusted to meet the political/diplomatic goals it has set forth:
Henceforth, American forces cannot afford to destroy villages to save them. They cannot afford to use artillery, gunships and ordnance from fixed-wing aircraft in populated areas, regardless of the provocation. They cannot afford to sacrifice innocent Iraqi civilians to reduce American casualties. They cannot afford to sweep up, incarcerate and hold for months thousands of Iraqis—many of them innocent—to apprehend a smaller number of guilty ones. They cannot afford to use pain, privation or humiliation to secure information.
Whether such actions are consistent with the laws of armed conflict is not the relevant criterion. What matters most is that such actions are inconsistent with the treatment of an allied population upon whose sufferance and support this mission depends.
James Steinberg and Michael O'Hanlon, also of the Brookings Institute have outlined a three point plan for getting the US out of Iraq:
First, we must make clear that our military presence in Iraq is designed to permit the Iraqis to freely choose their own future -- even if it is not fully to our liking. We should indicate not just that we will leave if asked but that we will ourselves plan to end the deployment of coalition forces following the election of an Iraqi government and the adoption of a new constitution next year. We should make clear that we (as part of a wider international coalition) would be prepared to stay beyond that time -- but only at the request of the new Iraqi government, and as part of a new, U.N.-sponsored mandate on terms that are acceptable to the new Iraqi government and to us.
Second, we must be clear about our legitimate security interests in Iraq. We have a right to insist that a new Iraqi government not threaten peace and security -- by developing weapons of mass destruction, harboring terrorists or attacking other nations. And we should certainly seek to use our influence to encourage a tolerant, pluralist society. But because this is a responsibility Iraq owes to all, not just us, we should shift the focus away from the United States as the enforcement arm of the international community to Iraq's neighbors and others that share these interests, including NATO and the United Nations. We should begin by convening a major international summit on Iraq, involving not only Western allies but also Arab leaders and Iraqis, at the time of the NATO summit next month in Istanbul. And we should invite the International Atomic Energy Agency to play a role in ensuring that a new Iraqi government does not pursue weapons programs.
Third, we should accelerate the training and equipping of new security forces for Iraq. Less than 10 percent of the necessary numbers of soldiers and police have been properly trained to date. Filling this vacuum is critical to the success of this strategy, because indigenous forces are far more likely than foreign forces to succeed in defeating the residual Baathist and foreign fighters in Iraq. If Arab countries and NATO devoted just 10 percent of their police and military training capacity to Iraqi forces, we could complete an intensified training process by next year.
I have not been a supporter of the efforts in Iraq. I've thought that we were wrong from the outset to go in and do what we did...but we're there. The important thing is that we clean up our mess and get out as soon as possible. I think those ideas outlined above are a very good start toward that goal.
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